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ARTICLE 
THE IDEALIST DISCOURSE OF LEGAL 
PROFESSIONALISM IN MARYLAND: 
DELINEATING THE OMISSIONS AND ELOQUENT 
SILENCES AS A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 
By: Kez U. Gabriel, J.D., Ph.D.* 
I. INTRODUCTION: LIKE ROSE-COLORED GLASSES 
Several years ago, I co-wrote a book on the sociology of education! with Reverend Dr. Michael S. Onwueme.2 Included in the book was a 
chapter titled "Teaching as a Profession." We intended for the book to be 
used by undergraduate students in their study of education and social 
sciences. Many of my academic peers who previously handled such a 
topic tended to grapple with it by asking and trying to answer one major 
question: Is teaching a profession? After first indulging the standard trait 
approach3 to the question, I reasoned that it probably mattered little how 
one came out in answering this basic descriptive or "What" question in 
any event. Thus, I decided to do something slightly different by posing 
* Kez. U. Gabriel, J.D., Ph.D. was fonnerlya Social-Behavioral Science Professor at the 
Anambra State College of Education and University of Technology in Nigeria, University of 
Alberta, Canada, American University, and the University of Alaska. He was also fonnerly 
Staff Attorney and Legal Services Director for the District of Columbia and Maryland based 
African Legal, Human, and Civil Rights Center, Inc. Mr. Gabriel is currently Strategic 
Litigation Counsel at the Arlington, Virginia Law Office of Oti W. Nwosu, LLC and in 
affiliation with the Greenbelt, Maryland Dobe Law Group, LLC. He is a graduate of 
American University, Washington College of Law, J.D., and received his doctorial degree at 
University of Alberta, Ph.D. The author thanks University of Baltimore Law Forum Articles 
Editor, Matthew Powell, and his editorial team for their technical assistance with this article. 
I MICHAEL S. ONWUEME & KEz GABRIEL-UGBOR, EDUCATION AND SOCIETY: THE 
SOCIOWGY OF EDUCATION (Nigerian Educational Research Association 1994). 
2 Reverend Dr. Michael S. Onwueme is a professor emeritus of education and religious 
studies at the University of Benin in Nigeria. 
3 The standard strategy was to outline upwards of ten characteristics of a profession, 
including: (1) skill based on theoretical knowledge; (2) long period of education and training; 
(3) entry regulation or license; (4) life-long commitment or career; (5) occupational 
association; (6) code of ethics; (7) independence or autonomy; (8) altruism or public service 
ideal; (9) occupational journal or magazine; and sense of community. Jd. at 116, 122. Then, 
methodically and systematically process teaching, teacher preparation, and teachers through 
each itemized trait or characteristic, and using the resulting grade balance sheet to finally 
make an overall determination as to the adjudged status of teaching as a profession. 
Employing basically the same "trait methodology," some of the appraisers and assessors of 
the professional claims of teachers and teaching ended up answering yes, others ended up 
answering no, while a third group would conclude that it depended on how one looked at it or 
what set or combination of the characteristics of a profession one chose to emphasize. Id. at 
122. 
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higher-order "Why" and "Whose Interests" analytic questions to reach 
my conclusions.4 I also proceeded to restate the chapter as "Teaching and 
the Question of Professionalization." With the purposes of the exercise 
fundamentally recast, the material immediately became more analytic, 
enterprising, and even provocative.5 
In this article, I attempt to bring the same ethic of progressive and 
transformative critique to bear on the "Ideals of Professionalism," the 
recently released document by the Commission on Professionalism 
(hereinafter the "Commission") of the Court of Appeals of Maryland.6 I 
specifically do so by delineating and analyzing some of the important 
omissions and eloquent silences in the thoughtful and well-intentioned 
document. This document represents a culmination of efforts that began 
in 2003 to strengthen and promote the standing of the legal profession 
under the direction of a Judicial Task Force on Professionalism. 7 Eight 
subcommittees of the Commission studied and reported upon several 
areas of concern identified by the Judicial Task Force on 
Professionalism. 8 The task force's goal was to identify concerns that 
appeared to threaten the historic glory and high professional ideals of the 
Maryland legal community, while also protecting and promoting the 
professional ideals.9 
The Commission studied several facets of lawyers' professional 
conduct and formulated methods and recommendations intended to raise 
professionalism standards in the Maryland legal community. The 
Commission developed a value system of professional conduct, featuring 
a set of standards that lawyers should aspire to, together with associated 
characteristics of accountability and trustworthiness; education, 
4 For example: Why would teaching and teachers want to join the ranks of a profession 
and professionals? Why would they not want to professionalize? Whose interests would 
society serve best by transforming the lower middle class occupation of elementary and 
secondary school teaching into a rock-solid middle class profession of powerful, prestigious, 
and privileged instructional experts? 
5 I actually found it a little easier to cut to the chase after prefacing the undertaking with 
the standard trait approach by going to the unstated heart of the professionalism matter, 
namely, the pursuit of social, cultural, and expert (i.e., skill and knowledge based) power, 
authority, wealth, privilege, and prestige. See generally P.J. CORFIELD, POWER AND THE 
PROFESSIONS IN BRITAIN, 1700-1850 (Routledge 1999); ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONAL 
POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTiTUTIONALIZATiON OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE (Univ. of Chicago 
Press 1986); and TERENCE J. JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER (Macmillan 1972). Most of 
my academic peers who reviewed the material afterwards considered it refreshing, interesting, 
transforming, and even progressive. 
6 MD. CODE ANN., CTS., JUDGES & ATTORNEYS § 16-800 app. (Ideals of Professionalism) 
(LexisNexis 2011), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/professionalism/pdfs/ideals.pdf 
(hereinafter "Ideals of Professionalism"). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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mentoring, and excellence; a calling to public service; as well as fairness, 
civility, and courtesy. 10 The stated goal was "to maintain and enhance the 
role of [Maryland] legal professionals as protectors of the rule oflaw.,,11 
While the principles set forth by the Commission are facially well-
intentioned, the document is overly idealistic as it views the world oflaw, 
lawyers, law practice, and legal professionalism through insular and 
antiseptic rose-colored glasses. As Millie Jackson's lyrics entitled "Rose 
Colored Glasses,,12 would suggest, such rose-colored glasses would show 
mostly the good part of conventional legal professionalism and understate 
the complex truth that many progressive lawyers would like to bring back 
into the professionalism equation. 
The Ideals of Professionalism do a good job of covering standard fare, 
in their present form, but they are incomplete, rose-colored, and antiseptic 
for our history. For one, the core values identified in the prefatory 
definition of professionalism not only omit equally important values of 
professional law practice such as justice, fairness, and fidelity to 
resolving disputes, but also read like rose-colored glasses that show 
mostly the good side but silence the problematic power-relations aspects. 
Second, there is not a consensus conception of law, legality, profession, 
and professionalism. Additionally, legal practice is not one size fits all as 
legal professionals are not a homogeneous group who see their work and 
the world the same way. Third, there is our historical and contemporary 
experience ofthe ready amenability oflaw, the legal system, and the legal 
profession to oppressive abuses and misuses. They range from the 
legalized machinations of Nazi Germany, apartheid South Africa, and 
American legalized historical racial and gender abuses, to the 
contemporary realities of Bush-era enablement of torture, human rights 
violations, privacy invasions, and negations of civil liberties. Practically, 
the Ideals of Professionalism largely omit nonstandard but important, 
timely, and progressive legal professionalism issues that it ought to have 
named and addressed directly. For that matter, the document promoting 
integrity and trustworthiness failed to formulate a clear protocol for 
attenuating the major concern in our legal community and the larger 
society that many lawyers are scandalous enablers of the rich and 
powerful. This article submits that these legitimate but silenced 
professionalism issues must be addressed. 
Moreover, it likely makes no practical difference whether such 
legalized violations are effected "pursuant to law" or "under color of law" 
once they become institutionalized through the legitimizing prerogatives 
10 ld. 
11 ld. at 2. 
12 MILLIE JACKSON, Rose Colored Glasses, on JUST A LJ'L BIT COUNTRY (SouthBound 
UK 1981). 
2011] The Idealist Discourse of Legal Professionalism 123 
and practices of the American Constitution and laws; the Congress and 
legislators; the Presidency and executive administrators; as well as the 
Supreme Court and the justices, judges, lawyers, and conventional legal 
professionalism. Like any good thing, there can be excessive 
conventional representations of the ideals of professionalism to the point 
of erasing any sense of the complex realities of professional law practice. 
Accordingly, this article will attempt to highlight some of the 
omissions and eloquent silences that act as a countervailing moral and 
ethical imperative in the progressive practice of law and the higher ethical 
conduct or portrayal of legal professionalism. Part II provides an 
overview of the document of interest, namely, the Ideals of 
Professionalism. Part III briefly examines the concepts of law, 
profession, and professionalism to set forth the framework for the 
progressive critique. Part IV integrates the preceding sections to 
delineate and analyze some of the important omissions and eloquent 
silences of the Ideals of Professionalism. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE "IDEALS OF PROFESSIONALISM" 
The "Ideals of Professionalism" (hereinafter "the Ideals") as 
promulgated by the Commission on Professionalism and approved by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland on March 8, 20 I 0, is an eight-page 
document divided into eight sections. 13 These sections are the prefatory 
definition of professionalism's core values; a preamble; itemized ideals of 
professionalism; accountability and trustworthiness; education, 
mentoring, and excellence; a calling to service; fairness, civility, and 
courtesy; and a concluding section that integrates the material in a 
summary. 14 According to the opening prefatory definition, 
"Professionalism is the combination of the core values of personal 
integrity, competency, civility, independence, and public service that 
distinguish lawyers as the caretakers of the rule oflaw.,,15 Thereafter, the 
preface invokes the enabling or grandfathering statute for the Ideals, 
stating that "[t]hese Ideals of Professionalism emanate from and 
complement the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct 
("MLRPC"), the overall thrust of which is well-summarized in ... the 
Preamble to those Rules . . . ," which understandably echoes or evokes 
the Ideals. 16 
The Preamble to the Ideals begins with the weighty reminder that 
Maryland 
13 Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at I (emphasis added). 
16 Id. 
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[l]awyers are entrusted with the privilege of practicing law. They 
take a firm vow or oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the 
United States and the State of Maryland. Lawyers enjoy a 
distinct position of trust and confidence that carries the significant 
responsibility and obligation to be caretakers for the system of 
justice that is essential to the continuing existence of a civilized 
society. 17 
The Preamble follows with the observation that as a custodian of the 
system of justice, each lawyer "must be conscious of this responsibility 
and exhibit traits that reflect a personal responsibility to recognize, honor, 
and enhance the rule of law in this society.,,18 The Preamble ends by 
emphasizing that the "Ideals and the characteristics set forth below are 
representative of a value system that lawyers must demand of themselves 
as professionals in order to maintain and enhance the role of legal 
professionals as the protectors of the rule oflaw.,,19 
Following the Preamble is a subheading itemizing specific standards 
or Ideals of Professionalism. 20 They urge lawyers to aspire to put fidelity 
to clients above their self-interests; to be a model of respect and regard 
for clients and other disputants; and to seek equality and fairness by 
avoiding all forms of wrongful discrimination in all activities.21 They ask 
lawyers to preserve, improve, and make available to all and for the 
common good the law, the legal system, and other dispute resolution 
processes.22 They urge each lawyer to aspire to practice law with a 
personal and mutually collegial commitment to the rules governing the 
profession.23 They ask each lawyer to preserve the generationally 
inherited dignity and integrity of the profession by his or her conduct and 
to strive for excellence in legal practice to promote the interests of clients, 
the rule of law, and the welfare of society.24 Finally, they ask lawyers to 
recognize that law practice is a calling in the spirit of public service rather 
than merely a business pursuit.25 
The next section of the Ideals, titled "Accountability and 
Trustworthiness," urges each lawyer to understand certain principles.26 
First, punctuality promotes a lawyer's credibility while tardiness and 
17 ld. at 1-2. 
18 ld. at 2. 
19 Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 2. 
20 ld. 
21 ld. 
22 ld. at 2-3. 
23 ld. at 3. 
24 ld. 
25 Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 3. 
26 ld. 
~ 
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neglect denigrate the individual lawyer and the legal profession. 27 
Second, personal integrity, by way of keeping one's commitments to 
clients, opposing counsel, and the courts, is essential to the honorable 
practice of law.28 Third, honesty and candid communication, subject to 
the legitimate limitation of confidentiality, promote credibility with 
clients, opposing counsel, and the COurtS?9 Fourth, the lawyer must 
scrupulously resist monetary pressures that cloud professional judgment 
and thereby tax credibility and integrity. 30 
The Ideals then move onto "Education, Mentoring, and Excellence.,,3l 
This section instructs each lawyer to use continuing legal education 
programs to remain current in legal knowledge and familiar with changes 
in the law affecting a client's interests. 32 It asks lawyers to take on the 
responsibility of promoting the image of the legal profession by 
appropriately educating non-lawyers and showing the importance of 
professionalism?3 It also implores senior lawyers to willingly mentor and 
teach less experienced lawyers both by setting a good example and by 
ensuring that each mentee learns and adheres to the principles enunciated 
in the Ideals?4 
In "A Calling to Service," the Ideals state that each lawyer should 
serve the public interest by communicating clearly, promptly, openly, and 
respectfully with clients, opposing counsel, and the courtS. 35 The Ideals 
state that lawyers should be mindful of the impact of their actions on 
others when scheduling events. 36 Further, lawyers should keep clients 
informed of the status of important matters affecting them and the nature 
and frequency of expected communication or information.37 They also 
state that each lawyer should always explain the client's options with 
sufficient detail for the client to make an informed decision, be respectful 
in all interactions with clients, opposing counsel, staff, and the courts, as 
well as "accept responsibility for ensuring that justice is available to 
everyone and not just those with financial means.,,38 
Next, "Fairness, Civility, and Courtesy" states that a lawyer should act 
fairly, civilly, and courteously in all dealings as a way to promote the 
system of justice and zealously promote the client's interests without 
27 Id 
28 Id. 
29 Id at 3-4. 
30 Id. at 4. 
31 Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 4. 
32 Id 
33 Id 
34 Id 
35 Id. at 4-5. 
36 Id. at 5 
37 Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 5. 
38 Id. at 5. 
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recourse to underhanded yelling, intimidation, and other bullying 
tactics.39 This section also asks each lawyer to remain objective in 
advising each client on the strengths and weaknesses of his or her case 
and not to allow the lawyer's actions or advice to become a tool for a 
client's improper motives, unethical directions, animosity toward an 
opposing party, or ill-advised wishes.40 Moreover, this section asks 
lawyers to use negotiation and alternative dispute resolution to achieve a 
client's objectives as appropriate, to use litigation tools to strengthen a 
client's case but not to harass, burden, or intimidate an opposing party, 
and as a matter of fairness, to note explicitly any changes to documents 
submitted for review by opposing counsel.41 
Lastly, a concluding section rounds out the Ideals in a summary 
fashion by stating that a lawyer should understand that professionalism 
requires civility in all dealings, respect and empathy for different points 
of view, and showing courtesy and maintaining decorum in the court.42 
Lawyers enhance professionalism by "preparing scrupulously for 
meetings and court appearances and by showing respect for the court, 
opposing counsel, and the parties through courteous behavior and 
respectful attire. ,.43 Lawyers should demonstrate courtesy and respect in 
all contexts, including with clients and colleagues, in the courtroom, with 
support staff, and with court personnel.44 "Hostility between clients 
should not become grounds for a lawyer to show hostility or disrespect to 
a party, opposing counsel, or the court.,,45 Patience enables the lawyer to 
exercise restraint, defuse anger, and reduce tension and animosity 
between parties or lawyers in volatile situations.46 "[T]he Ideals of 
Professionalism are to be observed in all manner of communication, and a 
lawyer should resist the impulse to respond uncivilly to electronic 
communications in the same manner as he or she would resist such 
impulses in other forms of communication.,,47 
We turn now to the part of this article that broaches multidimensional 
conceptions of law, profession, and professionalism to set forth the 
analytic framework that helps lay bare some of the important omissions 
and eloquent silences. The hope is that the Maryland Bar and Bench 
would appreciate that the thoughtful and well-intentioned document in 
place today is nonetheless incomplete. In candor, the document is still a 
39 !d. at 5-6. 
40 Id. at 6. 
41 Id. at 6-7. 
42 Id. at 7. 
43 Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 7. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 !d. at 8. 
47 Id. 
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work in progress because in its present form, it has, as it were, left for 
another day (as many courts would!) some of the issues and concerns that 
either were never properly before the Commission or could be better 
handled at a different time or occasion. It is anybody's guess when that 
other time or occasion may arrive and whose criteria will be used to 
decide what is "properly before the Commission." It will suffice to say 
that being mindful of unfinished business sometimes makes one more 
circumspect about overstating even a working masterpiece. 
III. OPERATING CONCEPTIONS OF LAW, PROFESSION, AND 
PROFESSIONALISM 
A. Multidimensional Conception of Law 
We start delineating our analytic framework by first considering the 
relevant conceptions of law because the purpose of the Ideals is 
ultimately to convey how best to practice law as a noble profession. For 
present purposes, we propose a five-fold conception of law that we hope 
broadly reflects the myriad approaches in jurisprudential literature. This 
is no elective work because unless we ask the necessary questions or raise 
the relevant issues, we would never broach the appropriate answers or the 
reasonable resolutions to the omissions and silences of interest here. 
Functional analytically speaking, law is the ordered process or 
institutional framework for effecting governmental social control,48 
resolving particular disputes, and modulating general social conflicts.49 
Analytic-jurisprudentially speaking, law is that command, order, or 
normative stipulation backed by an express or implied threat of 
punishment for failure to obey or comply. 50 Under a critical or legal 
realist analytical approach, law not only refers to context-driven value-
based decisions made by judges and other authorized officials to resolve 
disputes,SI but also represents politics (i.e., the imperatives of power and 
resource allocation) by other means in a similar fashion as war is politics 
and diplomacy by alternate means. 52 Under the post-modernist analytical 
approach, law is knowledge-power or expert-skill-power encoded as 
discourse, discursive practice, rhetoric, and symbolic representation in 
48 DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (Academic Press 1976). See also Jack P. 
Gibbs, Law as a Means of Social Control, SOCIAL CONTROL: VIEWS FROM THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 83 (Jack P. Gibbs ed., 1982). 
49 BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT (Carolina Academic Press 5th ed. 
1997). 
50 Gibbs, supra note 48, at 89 (referencing exponents of analytic jurisprudence like John 
Austin, Max Weber, E. Adamson Hoebel and Hans Kelsen). 
51 Id. at 91 (referencing exponents oflegal realism like Oliver Wendel Holmes, Kurt N. 
Llewellyn, and Jerome Frank). 
52 See generally MICHAEL MANDEL, THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF 
POLITICS IN CANADA (Thompson Educ. Publishers, Inc. rev. ed., 1994). 
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historically specific sites and modalities of enunciation. 53 From this 
vantage point, lawyers are traders, who cater mostly to the powerful, 
occasionally promoting the rule of law or maintaining law and order in 
the contexts of tangible social, economic, political, and cultural 
inequalities and conflicts. 54 
For its part, natural law jurisprudence views law as the right-oriented, 
morally just, or justifiable enterprise of governing human behavior in 
accordance with clear and consistent rules, procedures, and principles of 
legality. 55 Law refers to those morally grounded propositional principles 
that govern the application of rules, based on past legal practice, to 
discern the morally justifiable unique correct answer to particular 
disputes or questions.56 Or else, legal claims are principle driven and 
constructive interpretive judgments combine retrospective and 
prospective elements of past official action and judicial practice in an 
unfolding narrative seeking to discern the best possible moral answer to 
particular disputes or questions. 57 In the process of such a constructive 
interpretation, which necessarily involves assigning value or purpose to 
the interpretation, the presumed purpose of law is to "constrain or justify 
the exercise of governmental power.,,58 Integrity in law, and thus in legal 
practice and legal professionalism, results best from interpretations that 
give the law a coherent moral vision, that is, interpretations that "express 
a coherent conception of justice and faimess.,,59 
The aim has been to emphasize that there is no unitary conception of 
law or legality, the very subject matter of legal practice and legal 
professionalism. Rather, there are equally legitimate and competing 
conceptions of law and legality that have far-reaching implications for 
lawyers, law practice, and legal professionalism. Arguably, appreciating 
and providing for the nuances and ramifications of the differing 
conceptions of law and legality, even if by way of annotations and 
mUltiple tracking, ultimately would be more complete and realistic for the 
everyday world of the legal profession. We tum now to consider the 
competing conceptions of a profession to appreciate and provide for the 
53 See generally LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD: TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION 
(Maureen Cain & Christine B. Harrington eds., N.Y. Univ. Press 1994). 
54 ld. 
55 BIX, supra note 49, at 82-86 (referencing a major historical exponent of Natural Law 
Theory, Lon Fuller). 
56 ld. at 87-89 (referencing 'the Right Answer thesis' as contained in the early writings of 
a major contemporary exponent of natural law theory. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (1977). 
57 BIX, supra note 49, at 89-91 (referencing "the principle of Best Fit Answer" as 
contained in the later work of a major contemporary exponent of natural law theory. See 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1986). 
58 BIX, supra note 49, at 91. 
59 ld. 
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complexities of the real world of law, lawyers, and professional law 
practice. 
B. Multidimensional Conception of Profession 
Generally, when we speak in terms of a job, an employment, a career, 
an occupation, or a profession, we seek to characterize the work people 
do part-time or full-time for income, advancement in rank, personal 
growth and fulfillment, service to others, and the pursuit of socially 
valued resources of power, wealth, and prestige.6o While for present 
purposes we shall consider an occupation as simply the work or 
employment in which an individual is engaged to earn a living, the more 
profound notion of a profession is quite a preeminent sociological 
phenomenon. 6 I What, then, is a profession? Disregard for now the 
satirical but suggestive medical service inspired quip made by 1925 
literary Nobel Laureate, George Bernard Shaw, to the effect that 
professions "are all conspiracies against the laity.,,62 Roughly half a 
century ago, respected authority Professor A. M. Carr-Saunders, who was 
fondly known as "the fine British student of the professions," opined that 
60 ONWUEME&GABRIEL-UGBOR,supranote l,at 112-13. 
61 Id. at 113. Further, all three major classical sociologists representing conservative, 
liberal, and radical orientations grappled with the professions and occupational groups as key 
aspects of the then emerging industrial social organization between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. For the more conservative Emile Durkheim, it was in terms of the social 
stability and social change effects of the division of labor (i.e., occupational differentiation 
and specialization), including the professional associations that he believed were like a middle 
entity between the individual and the more distant national government. For the liberal-
conservative pragmatic Max Weber, it was in terms of the rise of skilled and credentialed 
experts and professionals as propertied middle classes, as well as the rise of formal 
organizations and the increasing specialization, bureaucratization, and rationalization of social 
life. For the radical Karl Marx, it was in terms of the headache posed to his program of class 
consciousness, class conflict, class struggle, and socialist transformation by the ambiguous 
petty-bourgeois class of skilled professionals and intellectuals. See generally SHAUN BEST, A 
BEGINNER'S GUIDE TO SOCIAL THEORY (Sage Publications Ltd. 2003) (2004); GEORGE RITZER, 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (McGraw-Hill 2008) (1983). 
62 GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE DOCTOR'S DILEMMA: WITH A PREFACE ON DOCTORS 
(Penguin Books 1957) (1946). Apparently, George Bernard Shaw had a bad experience 
having a toe nail problem fixed by doctors whom he believed covered each other's 
malpractice and had an antisocial vested interest in peoples' ill health! Shaw also was 
reflecting on a situation in which an investigative journalist posed as an influenza patient for a 
major London newspaper and got different advice and prescriptions from the eminent 
physicians in the city at the end of the nineteenth century. "But the effect of this state of 
things is to make the medical profession a conspiracy to hide its own shortcomings. No doubt 
the same may be said of all professions. They are all conspiracies against the laity; and 1 do 
not suggest that the medical conspiracy is either better or worse than the military conspiracy, 
the legal conspiracy, the sacerdotal conspiracy, the pedagogic conspiracy, the royal and 
aristocratic conspiracy, the literary and artistic conspiracy, and the innumerable industrial, 
commercial, and financial conspiracies, from the trade unions to the great exchanges, which 
make up the huge conflict which we call society. But it is less suspected." /d. at 17-18 
(emphasis added.). 
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a profession is "an occupation based upon specialized intellectual study 
and training, the purpose of which is to supply skilled service or advice to 
others for a definite fee or salary.,,63 An even more glorious and 
contemporary rendition posits that a "profession is a vocation founded 
upon specialized educational training the purpose of which is to supply 
disinterested counsel and service to others, for a direct and definite 
compensation, wholly apart from expectation of other business gain.,,64 
Notwithstanding that society pejoratively refers to prostitution as the 
oldest profession, the historical fact is that classically there were only 
three professions: divinity, law, and medicine.65 Generally speaking, and 
leaving aside the broader functionalist (conservative), interactional 
(liberal), and conflict (radical) perspectives,66 there are four conceptual 
approaches to understanding professions in the relevant literature. First, 
there is the typical trait approach, which would list upwards of ten 
characteristics of a profession for examining a particular occupation or 
profession of interest. 67 Second, there is the related historical-descriptive 
63 ONWUEME & GABRIEL-UGBOR, supra note I, at lB. 
64 COMPETITION COMMISSION, ARCHITECTS' SERVICES, ch. 7, para. 123 (1977), 
available at http://www.competition-commission.org.ukirep jlub/reports/1976 _I 979/fulltext! 
108c07.pdf. 
65 R.W. PERKS, ACCOUNTING AND SOCIETY 2 (Chapman & Hall 1993) as cited in the 
Wikipedia entry for "Profession", http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilProfession (last visited Mar. 
17,2011). 
66 A theoretical perspective is a broad assumption about society, social organization, and 
social or human behavior that forms a point of view for studying, examining, explaining, or 
analyzing particular social phenomena, issues, or problems. The "Functionalist Perspective" 
assumes that society or the social system, much like biological organisms, is made of a 
structure of interdependent parts, each of which has a consequence or function for the orderly 
survival, maintenance, and incremental progress of the whole system. It is a conservative-
reactionary or big-picture orientation. The "Interactional Perspective" holds that society or 
social experience comes down to those small-scale social structures and processes, 
transactions, or interactions by which people act toward, respond to, and influence one another 
in everyday life. It is a liberal-pragmatic or small-is-beautiful orientation. For its part, the 
"Conflict Perspective" views society or social formation as an arena of struggle, conflict, and 
change, fostered through and by various social classes and social conflict groups, over socially 
valued but scarce resources such as power, wealth, and prestige. This is a critical-progressive 
macro-level or big picture orientation. See generally BEST, supra note 61; RITZER, supra note 
61. 
67 While the so-called Characteristics of a Profession can range between seven and ten, a 
rather extensive and almost exhaustive list appears under the entry for "Profession" in the 
online encyclopedia, Wikipedia, as highlighted below: 
I. Skill based on theoretical knowledge; 
2. Professional association; 
3. Extensive period of education; 
4. Testing of competence; 
5. Institutional training; 
6. Licensed practitioners; 
7. Work autonomy; 
8. Code of professional conduct or ethics; 
9. Self-regulation; 
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approach, which seeks to establish the historical sequence or stages 
through which an occupation acquires the characteristics of a 
profession.68 Third, there is the ideal-type analytic approach, which uses 
two major analytic criteria, namely, control of entry and service by the 
organized profession and practitioner autonomy in rendering the service, 
in locating occupational groups on an occupation-profession continuum, 
with law and medicine as the ideal-type, classic professions.69 
Fourth, there is the power-structural analytic approach, one version of 
which fundamentally sees the professions as pressure groups that seek to 
maximize their power and privilege in society.70 Based on this approach, 
the service ideals and codes of ethics exist as much for the public interest 
as for the personal and professional interests in securely maximizing 
socially valued resources of power, wealth, and prestige. Similarly, entry 
regulations such as credentials, professional exams, licensure, and 
accreditation exist not simply to provide clients with high caliber service, 
but to also serve as a gate-keeping strategy to minimize competition and 
enable practitioners to maximize the return on their investment through a 
10. Public service and altruism; 
11. Exclusion, monopoly and legal recognition; 
12. Control of remuneration and advertising; 
13. High status and rewards; 
14. Individual clients; 
15. Middle-class occupations; 
16. Male-dominated; 
17. Ritual; 
18. Legitimacy; 
19. Inaccessible body of knowledge; 
20. Indeterminacy of knowledge. 
Wikipedia, Profession, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilProfession (last visited March 15,2011). 
68 Terrence J. Johnson has ably criticized this approach for being only marginally 
analytic and for canvassing a misleading idea of the "natural history of professionalism" that 
has produced contradictory results for the United States as compared to the United Kingdom. 
For the United States, the historical sequence was: (I) a full-time occupation emerges; (2) a 
training institution is established; (3) a professional association is founded; (4) state regulation 
or legal protection is secured through political agitation; and (5) a formal code of ethics is 
adopted. For the United Kingdom, the historical sequence was: (1) a professional association; 
(2) change in the name of the occupation; (3) code of ethics; (4) agitation to obtain state 
recognition or mandate; and (5) the concurrent development of training facilities. See 
ONWUEME & GABRIEL-UGBOR, supra note 1, at 116 (following JOHNSON, supra at note 5, at 
ch. 2). Another source on the American experience also identifies the historical milestones 
through which an occupation became a profession as follows: (1) it became a full-time 
occupation; (2) the first training school was established; (3) the first university school was 
established; (4) the first local association was established; (5) the first national association was 
established; (6) the codes of ethics were introduced; and (7) state licensing laws were 
established. PERKS, supra at note 65, at 2. 
69 Eric Hoyle, Professionality, Professionalism and Control in Teaching, in 1 
MANAGEMENT IN EDUCATION, 314-15 (y. Houghton, et al. eds., 1975). 
70 JOHNSON, supra note 5, at ch. 2. 
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type of monopoly.71 The other version of the approach is Donald 
Treiman's structural theory of occupational prestige, according to which 
occupational prestige is ultimately rooted in power resources and 
relations.72 Validated with international comparative data, the key 
propositions are that: (1) specialization through the division of labor in 
society creates occupational differentials in power resources (expert and 
technical knowledge, skills, authority, and wealth); (2) which in tum 
produce differentials in occupational privilege (autonomy, trust, 
independent judgment, working conditions, etc.); and (3) the two together 
result in differentials in occupational prestige.73 
Once again, the point has been to appreciate that there is no unitary 
conception of a profession, the very phenomenon that is supposed to be 
the horse and carriage of legal professionalism. As in the case of law and 
legality, there exist equally legitimate and competing conceptions of a 
profession that have far-reaching ramifications for lawyers, professional 
law practice, and legal professionalism. Stripped to its fundamentals, the 
notion of a profession is a multidimensional concept having prestigious 
power resources and even monopolistic power relations, practitioner 
autonomy, and self-governing control of entry and services at its heart 
and soul. Arguably, there is nothing particularly angelic about such 
attributes. Accepting this characterization would entail openness to the 
numerous ramifications in the everyday world of lawyers, law practice, 
and the legal profession. By extension, annotating, parallel tracking, or 
otherwise customizing the discourse of legal professionalism to reflect 
such ramifications would ultimately foster a more complete and realistic 
discourse of legal professionalism for myriad practitioners. We tum now 
to consider the all-important matter of professionalism itself. 
C. Multidimensional Conception of Professionalism 
Merriam-Webster's online dictionary defines professionalism rather 
flippantly as "the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark a 
profession or a professional.,,74 An online source oriented to the 
commercial world, BusinessDictionary.com, is much more forthcoming 
in defining professionalism as the "[ m ]eticulous adherence to undeviating 
courtesy, honesty, and responsibility in one's dealings with customers 
and associates, plus a level of excellence that goes over and above the 
71 JOHNSON, supra note 5, at ch. 2; see MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RiSE OF 
PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1977); see also YVES DEZALAY & DAVID 
SUGARMAN, PROFESSIONAL COMPETITION AND PROFESSIONAL POWER (1995). 
72 ONWUEME & GABRIEL-UGBOR, supra note 1, at 120-21. Accord DONALD J. TREIMAN, 
OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1-19 (1977). 
73 ONWUEME & GABRIEL-UGBOR, supra note 1, at 120-22. 
74 Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/professionalism (last 
visited March 25, 2011). 
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commercial considerations and legal requirements.,,75 For its part, the 
Ideals open with a working prefatory definition of professionalism as "the 
combination of the core values of personal integrity, competency, civility, 
independence, and public service that distinguish lawyers as the 
caretakers of the rule of law.,,76 Accordingly, regardless of the specific 
definition, professionalism has to do with a passionate belief in, and 
commitment to, one's professional roles and responsibilities as a lawyer, 
together with the associated ideals, standards, values, principles, laws, 
ethics, colleagues, organizations, and service to the public. 
However, there still is a crucial aspect of the concept of 
professionalism that must be acknowledged. At this point in our 
discussion, I would like to introduce an analogy. Whenever I have 
occasion to discuss the topic or idea of "postmodern social theory" 77 with 
my upper-class undergraduate students, I usually begin by giving them a 
conceptual anchor, frame of reference, or advance organizer as follows: 
There is a debatable condition of post-modernity, an ongoing process of 
post-modernization, and a dogged ideology or belief system of 
postmodernism. I would invite them to try to do the same thing with the 
related and flavorful topic of the global condition, globalization, and 
globalism in contemporary social theory.78 I would then close by stating: 
Even if we cannot conclude that the world is in a condition of post-
modernity, reasonable people would at least agree that the process of 
post-modernization is underway, and that regardless, the ideology or 
belief system of postmodemism appears to be here to stay. Their smiling 
faces and nodding heads would be all the feedback I needed before 
inviting an open discussion on those topical flavors of contemporary 
social theory. 
Extrapolating and translating, there is the historically settled condition 
of law practice being a profession and lawyers being professionals. 
Furthennore, the historical and contemporary process of 
professionalization may ebb and flow with changes in knowledge, 
75 BusinessDictionary.com, Professionalism, http://www.businessdictionary.com/ 
definitionlprofessionalism.html (last visited March 25, 2011). 
76 Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 1. 
77 According to which we are living in a new era in which issues of culture and identity 
predominate, economic activities and operations are globalized, and information and 
communication technologies are constricting time and space and forging new forms of 
communities, identities, and associations. However, the term "post-modernism" or "post-
modernity" has come to mean many different things. "Some associate it with postindustrial 
society, others with the post-Marxist world; still others view it as a movement in literary 
criticism, and some view it as a legitimation of new voices in a diverse and multicultural 
society." JAMES FARGANIS, READINGS IN SOCIAL THEORY 357 (McGraw-Hill 6th ed. 2011). 
78 For a dizzying but rewarding digest of contemporary social theory, including the topics 
of globalization and post-modem social theory, see generally BEST, supra note 61; RITZER, 
supra note 61. 
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technology, and the economy, but the ideology or belief system of legal 
professionalism has a staying power regardless of other changes. Thus, 
professionalism is an ideological practice or belief system in the same 
manner as any other "isms" out there in the institutions, organizations, 
and everyday realities of our social, cultural, political, and economic life. 
Ideologies (e.g., the American Dream, the service ideal, and the rule of 
law) are complex socio-political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural 
phenomena that attempt to explain, justify, or rationalize prevailing 
meanings, values, and practices.79 Their complex socio-Iegal functions 
include to mystify or demystify, to energize or de-energize, to enable or 
disable, to mobilize or demoralize, to challenge or defend, and to promote 
or undermine the affected groups, interests, priorities, or objectives. 
Practically, it is like a sword and a shield, a fort or firewall from which to 
play both offense and defense in the professional project of asserting and 
guarding a monopolistic claim over some specified domain of social 
life.80 Little wonder that Terence J. Johnson firmly instructs that 
professionalism is the entrenchment by practitioners and their self-
governing organizations of institutionalized forms of occupational 
control, autonomy, authority, ideology, and mystique. 81 Therein lie some 
of the important unstated features of the professionalism ideals under 
examination and critique herein. 
Again, we see that professionalism is not a unitary or disinterested 
idea. Rather, it is a multidimensional concept that is rife with important 
questions of professional and practitioner self-interest, monopoly, power, 
autonomy, ideology, mystique, and cultivated civility. Appreciating and 
making provisions or allowances for how different lawyers, practice 
groups, or practice niches might prefer or have to go about those aspects 
of legal professionalism would likely make the Ideals more complete and 
realistic for the myriad practitioners in today's society. The thought to 
take and extend just the very crucial concomitant of professional 
autonomy or independence is a feature that seems to be common to most 
definitions of professionalism and the four various approaches to a 
79 While the material conveyed here has been influenced during a course of two decades 
of extended readings of the rather dense ideas orland writings of the likes of Ray Williams, 
Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, and Michael Apple, the interested reader would find an 
accessible exposition of the concept of ideology in the works of TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY: 
AN INTRODUCTION (Verso Publishers 1991); DAVID HAWKES, IDEOLOGY (Routledge 2d ed. 
2003). Even an online source, BusinessDictionary.com, defines ideology practically as a 
"system of ideas that explains and lends legitimacy to actions and beliefs of a social, religious, 
political, or corporate entity." BusinessDictionary.com, Ideology, 
http://www.businessdictionary.comldefinitionlideology.html (last visited March 25, 20 11). 
80 See, e.g., GERALD LARKIN, OCCUPATIONAL MONOPOLY AND MODERN MEDICINE 
(Tavistock Publications 1983). 
81 JOHNSON, supra note 5, at ch. 4 (cited in ONWUEME & GABRIEL-UGBOR, supra note I, 
at 114. 
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profession indicated in a previous sub-section: the trait approach, the 
historical-descriptive approach, the ideal-type analytic approach, and the 
two-prong power-structural analytic approach. According to one source, 
professionals are autonomous in the sense that they can make 
independent judgments about their work. 82 A concurring source has 
noted that professional autonomy is an essential characteristic of 
professional ideology. 83 As such, professional autonomy is based on 
three claims: 
First, the work of professionals entails such a high degree of skill 
and knowledge that only fellow professionals can make accurate 
assessments of professional performance. Second, professionals 
are characterized by such a high degree of selflessness and 
responsibility that they can be trusted to work conscientiously. 
Third, in the rare instance in which individual professionals do 
not perform with sufficient skill or conscientiousness, their 
colleagues may be trusted to undertake the proper regulatory 
action.84 
Continuing, the source quickly advises that autonomy "has other 
meanings.,,85 Specifically, "{p}rofessional autonomy is often described 
as a claim of professionals that has to serve primarily their own 
interests.,,86 Moreover, "this professional autonomy can only be 
maintained if members of the profession subject their activities and 
decisions to a critical evaluation by other members of the profession. ,,87 
Thus, rather than simply serving the public interest, the concept of 
autonomy embraces not only independent judgment, but also self-interest 
and a continuous process of critical evaluation of ethics and procedures 
from within the profession itself. 88 
82 MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1981). 
83 Sivakumar Velayutham & Hector Perera, The Historical Context of Professional 
Ideology and Tension and Strain in the Accounting Profession, 22(1) ACCT. HISTORIANS J. 81, 
95 \!une 1995). 
ld. 
85 Wikipedia, supra note 67 (citing J. Hoogland & H. Jochensen, Professional Autonomy 
and the Normative Structure of Medical Practice, 21.5 THEORETICAL MED. 457, 457·75 
(September 2000». 
~6 Id. 
87 ld. 
88 !d. 
136 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 41.2 
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
A. General Analytic Thrusts and Premises 
We can encapsulate our major analytic premises by distilling and 
summarizing the general thrusts of the previous sections. First, the 
subject matter predicate of law practice and the legal profession, law, or 
legality is a multidimensional concept requiring corresponding nuances 
and ramifications in any composite, realistic, and effective discourse of 
legal professionalism for all practitioners. Strictly speaking, there are 
dispute resolution, command-obeying, governmental social control-
oriented, value-driven decisional, political discursive encoding, clear and 
consistent legality oriented, moral propositional, and justice-oriented 
dimensions to law and legality. Second, the idea of a profession is a 
multidimensional concept susceptible to various approaches from which 
one can distill fundamentals that are not particularly angelic or saintly, 
such as purported public service, prestigious and monopolistic power 
relations, practitioner autonomy and independence, and self-governing 
exclusionary control of entry and services. Consistent with the complex 
and contradictory notion of a profession, neither legal practice nor the 
legal profession that is the horse and carriage of legal professionalism 
itself is "one size fits all." Analogous to competing and equally 
legitimate conceptions of law and legality, there are competing and 
equally legitimate professional law practice dimensions, orientations, 
niches, values, interests, imperatives, and priorities. These dimensions 
require corresponding nuances and ramifications in any composite, 
realistic, and effective discourse of legal professionalism for all 
practitioners. Third, as the propeller shaft for legality, the rule of law, 
legal practice, and the legal profession, professionalism is not a unitary or 
disinterested idea. Instead, professionalism is a multidimensional concept 
entrenched by the profession and practitioners with many socially 
problematic questions of power, autonomy, ideology, mystique, and 
cultivated civility. Again, appreciating and providing for the nuances and 
implications of those complex and contradictory dynamics would 
certainly make for a more complete, realistic, and effective discourse of 
legal professionalism for all practitioners who understandably do not 
always look at their work the same way. 
B. Particular Applications and Discussions 
i. Incomplete Core Values 
The core values of professionalism identified in the prefatory 
definition of the Ideals are incomplete in that they omit and silence 
equally legitimate and competing core values of law, legal practice, and 
legal professionalism. Specifically, there is no mention of equity, justice, 
and fairness as core values oflaw, legal practice, or legal professionalism. 
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This omission is rather surprising because these values should actually be 
both our moral and ethical imperative as lawyers and legal professionals. 
If nothing else, our inquiry into the hydra-headed concept of law 
evidences that there are value-driven, moral propositional, and justice and 
fairness dimensions to law and legality. As 1991 Burmese Human Rights 
Nobel Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi, would say, the intrinsic virtue to law 
is really its capacity to foster a sense of justice understood as fundamental 
fairness. 89 The intrinsic virtue to law's concomitant order is the reflective 
discipline of a people satisfied that justice has been done, can be done, 
and will be done.90 Thus, in formulating a more composite, realistic, and 
effective discourse of legal professionalism for all practitioners, the core 
values of equity, justice, and fairness must be constitutive of our 
operational definition of professionalism consistent with the legitimate 
professional law practice groups, dimensions, orientations, niches, values, 
interests, imperatives, and priorities that they reflect or represent. Neither 
law text and talk nor the discourse of professionalism would be complete 
without directly naming and claiming such values as fundamental 
constitutive features. 
There is also no mention of fidelity or commitment to resolving 
disputes or conflicts as a core value. Again, this is surprising as many of 
us know or have reason to know that some lawyers actually persist in 
making disputes worse at the expense of our collective and individual 
reasonableness, sincerity, honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness as 
professionals. We certainly saw a problem-solving, dispute-resolving, or 
conflict-modulating dimension to law and legality, which law practice 
and legal professionalism should expressly mirror as a core value. For 
that matter, it taxes professionalism's stated core value of civility or 
courtesy when a practitioner fully intending on resolving particular 
disputes fairly, justly, and expeditiously is forced to endure the 
procedural abuses and tactical maneuvers of another practitioner whose 
only well-compensated interest is to stall the proceedings and frustrate the 
other side. Meanwhile, a non-interventionist court typically would 
indulge such ways and means of the adversarial Anglo-American system, 
which further drains the wellspring of patience and civility relative to 
opposing counsel, other litigants, witnesses, and the affected public. 
Regardless, as the law and some family and domestic relations disputants 
may rightly characterize such a scenario of abuse of power and internal 
contradictions as irreconcilable differences, the arising legal practice 
transactional conflicts may appear in forms the Ideals could mistakenly 
try to exhaust unsuccessfully with the language of civility and courtesy. 
With respect, while those are certainly important professional qualities to 
89 AUNG SAN Suu KYI, FREEDOM FROM FEAR (Michael Aris ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
90 See id. 
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be "cultivated" and "exhibited" in all circumstances, the operational 
dynamics and power-discursive elements are arguably so complex that 
only a multidimensional discourse of professionalism could capture the 
myriad nuances and commitments justly, fairly, and equitably. In sum, 
the aforementioned discussion suggests that the Ideals neglected or failed 
to formulate a clear protocol for attenuating the major concern in our 
community that lawyers and the legal profession are scandalous enablers 
of the rich and powerful. 
ii. Rose-Colored Omissions and Silences 
Nevertheless, the core values of professionalism identified in the 
prefatory definition that opens the Ideals appear to view law, lawyers, law 
practice, and the legal profession through rose-colored glasses. The 
tendered core values and ideals mostly show good sides of legal 
professionalism as "independence, public service, caretakers, and rule of 
law," but the Ideals are otherwise mum about such underbellies as 
collective and practitioner self-interested exclusionary and monopolistic 
control of entry and services, let alone the prestigious and potentially 
abusive power and wealth associated with the same. As a reminder, the 
ultimate focus is ethics and professional responsibility. Ethics, properly 
understood, means much more than mere compliance with the Maryland 
Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct, from which the Ideals both 
emanate and complement according to the prefatory section of the Ideals. 
Thus, and hold your breath if you may, it is at least debatable that lawyers 
are not simply "caretakers," "custodians," "guardians," "protectors of the 
rule of law," or "protectors of the system of justice" as the Ideals 
eloquently avers. The ideology and mystique of "caretakers," 
"guardians," and "public service" understates the individual and 
collective self-interest of the legal profession in serving mostly the paying 
or well-heeled public. Similarly, the mere exhortation to make law 
available to everyone does not equal a general professional mandate or a 
specific practitioner obligation to furnish legal representation to the 
economically underprivileged members of the same public whose interest 
the Ideals purportedly serve as stated in the Ideals of Professionalism and 
A Calling to Service sections. 
Even more importantly, the Ideals omit and silence the reality that 
lawyers are excluders and gate-keepers of access to the citadels of power 
and state-legitimated authority euphemistically called the rule of law, but 
also known as the relations of ruling. Even assuming that the focus is on 
the rule of law, by now we can legitimately ask such rule and law a 
number of questions. Let us improvise some dramatized accompaniment 
with apologies to the bashful Bar and Bench. "This tribunal would like to 
get some direct and cross-examination on the record. May the witness 
called the 'Rule of Law' take the stand please? Bailiff, you may now 
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swear in the witness. SirlMa'am, do you understand that you are under 
oath? Under the penalty of perjury, this tribunal obligates you to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Do you understand 
that?" "Yes, your honor." "'The rule of what law?' is the fundamental 
question for you here. Is it the law of dispute resolution, the law of 
command backed by threat, or the law of moral-propositional right 
answer principle? Alternatively, is it the law of governmental social 
control, or the law of governing human conduct by clear and consistent 
principles of legality? Or is it the law of avenging norm violation, the 
law of discursive power and symbol trading for established interests, or 
the law of politics by other means with all the implications for 
domination, oppression, and even exploitation? Do, or should, all 
practitioners necessarily expect, want, or have to be caretakers, guardians, 
or custodians for all those types of rule of law too? For that matter, could 
the 'rule' just as well be 'of the integrity-enhancing constructive-
interpretive 'law' of equity, justice, and fairness, which we indicated 
should be a core ethical value or imperative of legal professionalism 
multidimensionally understood? Which one is it, Mr.lMs. Rule of Law? 
Is the witness taking the 5th or reserving testimony until the further 
advice of counsel? You may step down, SirlMa'am." 
iii. Axiomatic Exhortation Without Needed Qualifications 
There is a much more urgent and present danger on this all-important 
question of what rule and which law is unstated in the axiomatic 
Preamble to the Ideals. From our well-documented historical and 
contemporary experience of the legal system and the legal profession, 
there is an imperative moral and ethical qualification missing from the 
Preamble to the Ideals. The Preamble states as axiomatic or self-evident 
that: 
Lawyers are entrusted with the privilege of practicing law. They 
take a firm vow or oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the 
United States and the State of Maryland. Lawyers enjoy a 
distinct position of trust and confidence that carries the significant 
responsibility and obligation to be caretakers for the system of 
justice that is essential to the continuing existence of a civilized 
society. Each lawyer, therefore, as a custodian of the system of 
justice, must be conscious of this responsibility and exhibit traits 
that reflect a personal responsibility to recognize, honor, and 
enhance the rule of law in this society.91 
All this weighty exhortation is as well and good as it is axiomatic or self-
evident. Even if by way of annotation or annex though, the one major 
91 Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6, at 1-2. 
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qualification this author would strongly recommend is that upholding the 
Constitution and laws or enhancing the rule of law be subject to the 
countervailing value and principle of conscientious objection whenever 
and wherever such Constitution or laws command or accessorize morally 
or ethically repugnant, degrading, or oppressive conduct. The magic 
language is "providing that such Constitution, laws, rules, regulations, or 
associated policies do not command complicity in, or obedience to, racial 
oppression, gender subordination, social discrimination, economic 
exploitation, political repression, genocide, ethnic cleansing, pogroms, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, grave human rights violations, or 
mass atrocities of any kind, shape, or form." A related qualification this 
author would strongly recommend would be to insert an express 
provision requiring lawyers, judges, and judicial and adjudicative 
tribunals to refrain from accessorizing or obliging any laws, rules, 
regulations, or executive actions that directly or indirectly facilitate 
governmental abuse of power, torture, or similar human rights violations. 
The two major qualifications strongly recommended above are 
obviously borne out of the lived and experienced worlds of law, the legal 
system, and legal professionalism past and present. Some legal scholars 
have claimed that the German legal system under Nazi rule so 
compromised procedural practices that there was no rule of law to 
generate a moral obligation to comply. 92 However, that is an overly 
impetuous presumption. The reality is that the law or the legal system is 
a chameleon. Therefore, both oppressors and liberators would find 
something for them in it. For the same reasons that the devil can cite the 
scripture for his purposes (to echo the mischievous William 
Shakespeare), the despot or tyrant would decipher, author, or enact some 
law to further his or her aggression. The truth is that there was some 
enacted law, rule, regulation, or policy authorizing virtually everything, 
including the good, the bad, and the ugly, done by, for, or in the name of 
the Nazi regime.93 At least in terms of an ordered or orderly process that 
92 BIX, supra note 49, at 12 (stating that respected legal philosopher, Ronald Dworkin, 
transformed or muted the debate between disputing scholars by showing that the opposite 
claims are both reasonable and compatible perspectives on German Nazi law and legality). 
93 DAVID J. HOGAN ET AL., THE HOLOCAUST CHRONICLE: A HISTORY IN WORDS AND 
PICTURES (Publications International, Ltd., 1st ed. 2001); Lucy S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR 
AGAINST THE JEWS 1933- 1945 (Collier McMillan 10th ed. 1986). Together with the other 
myriad decrees, rules and regulations passed by the German Nazi government, the famous 
Nuremberg Laws of 1933 are legion, even excluding the thirteen later amendments. 
Noteworthy "laws" in the Nuremburg Laws of 1933 include the Law for the Protection of 
German Blood and German Honor, the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil 
Service, and the Law Against the Overcrowding of German Schools and Institutions of Higher 
Learning. To help ensure political repression, the National Press Law served to squelch the 
morally courageous, professionally ethical, and politically determined discursive resistance of 
some progressive-conservative yet anti-oppressive journalists of the Munich Post, including 
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the legal system, law enforcement, lawyers, and legitimated laws and 
regulations typically make possible, the Nazi regime was quite efficient at 
running a massive bureaucracy and following protocol. Reportedly, too, 
even while wearing the banner of organized and disciplined 
professionalism, the German legal system and the vast majority of 
German jurists and lawyers quickly accommodated or adapted themselves 
to the dictates and proclivities of the Nazi regime.94 Additionally, even 
long after World War II, apartheid South Africa distinguished itself in 
entrenching and working the machinery of racial oppression, political 
repression, and economic exploitation with the active participation of its 
Constitution and laws, legal system, the judiciary, and the legal 
profession with a good dose of professionalism to boot. 95 
Moreover, even after the Bill of Rights had been ratified in 1791, the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States and the State of Maryland 
Erhard Auer, Fritz Gerlich, Martin Gruber, Edmund Goldschagg, and Julius Zerfass. 
Unreserved acknowledgment is due to Erhard Auer in particular. Before being "disappeared" 
by Hitler's henchmen, he tirelessly reconfigured conventional journalism training and 
professionalism to expose the schemes and machinations of the Nazi Party and leadership 
through a combination of savvy investigative and tabloid-style articles between 1923 and 
1933. HOGAN, supra, at 23-25. 
"Nazi" is a contraction for National Socialists, which full Western-style democratic and 
civilized political party name was National Socialist German Workers' Party. /d. The Nazi 
regime successfully passed The Enabling Act to the Nuremberg Laws on March 23, 1933 with 
more than the two-thirds majority Hitler needed in the German legislature, the Reichstag. ld. 
By so doing, a professional legislative body in a Western-style democracy and civilized 
society gave the executive branch the legal authority to enact any laws or decrees it considered 
necessary and proper to promote and safeguard the interests of the nation for the following 
four years. ld. Rather than responding to the immediacy of a September 11, 2001-style 
terrorist attack, the Nazi regime had a composite and longer-term goal of promoting Nordic or 
Aryan racial purity, galvanizing the distressed German economy, and restoring the historic 
glory of both the German military and German territorial polity. Jd. 
94 See HOGAN, supra note 93, at 101. 
95 Something approaching an expose will be found in ANTHONY H. RICHMOND, GLOBAL 
APARTHEID: REFUGEES, RACISM AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 
1994). "When the Nationalist Party came to power in South Africa in 1948, building on 
existing forms of discrimination and segregation, it proceeded to create the system that came 
to be known as 'apartheid.' In defending the South African Group Areas Act in 1951, then 
President Dr. Malan argued that it was essential to keep the groups apart in order to maintain 
'racial peace'. . .. This inequality has been maintained by systemic discrimination beginning 
with the Labor Regulations Act of 1913, which created the 'reserves,' later to be described as 
'homelands,' confining the African popUlation to 13 per cent of the total area of the country. 
Subsequent legislation, up to and including the Influx Control Act (1986), regulated the 
movement of people into urban areas. Other measures included the Blacks (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act (1945), the Population Registration Act (1950), which required everyone to 
carry racially classified identification, the Group Areas Acts (1950 and 1966), and the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act (1951). Added to these were a series of [administrative, 
regulatory and policy] measures entrenching the dominant economic and political power of 
the 'White' popUlation by denying full citizenship and franchise, suppressing political 
opposition, and restricting access to education and social rights .... " ld. at 208-09. 
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still disenfranchised and relegated women to the status of non-persons 
unable to vote or be voted for until the 19th Amendment in 1920.96 The 
United States also promoted and protected racial slavery by expressly 
safeguarding the importation of such persons as chattel slaves until 1808 
under Article 1, section 9 of the Constitution,97 while slavery was not 
prohibited outright until 1865 by the 13th Amendment.98 Even then, the 
Constitution and laws continued to endorse racial slavery by reducing 
African Americans to three-fifth of a person for electoral population base 
calculations under Article 1, section 2.99 This was not changed until 1868 
by section 2 of the 14th Amendment. 100 
For that matter, legal professionalism, an overly praised and 
generationally inherited masterpiece existed in 1857 when the respected 
Frederick, Maryland native lawyer and Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, Roger Taney, authored the racially abusive and oppressive Dred 
Scott Decision. 101 Acknowledging historical realities, it certainly took the 
professional competency, civility, and decorum of eminent Supreme 
Court justices in a civilized society to hold, while hiding behind the so-
called state action doctrine, that corporations and businesses could 
continue racially abusive discrimination in 1883.102 Furthermore, it 
certainly took the cultivated competency, civility, independence, and 
public service of many respected lawyers and eminent Supreme Court 
justices to formulate the racially abusive separate-but-equal doctrine 
under the Plessy v. Ferguson opinion of 1896.103 This glorified and 
generational historic professionalism was in place when the University of 
Maryland School of Law and the legal profession would not admit 
women or African Americans, including Thurgood Marshall. The 
Constitution and laws of both the United States and the State of Maryland 
not only "exhibited" slave codes and, later, post-abolition Jim Crow laws 
96 u.S. CaNST. amend. XIX. 
97 U.S. CaNST., art. 1, § 9 (repealed 1808). 
98 U.S. CaNST. amend. XIII. 
99 U.S. CaNST., art. 1, § 2 repealed by U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
100 U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
101 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). This decision held that persons of 
African ancestry, whether slave or free, were not and could not be American citizens under the 
Declaration of Independence. ld It also held that such persons could not sue to win their 
freedom in federal courts because they had no standing under the diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to law. ld. It declared that slaves were chattel 
whose owners Congress could not deprive of their property rights without due process oflaw 
as guaranteed by the Constitution. ld It also held that Congress did not even have the 
Constitutional authority to prohibit slavery in federal territories. Jd 
102 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
103 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The case held that legalized racial apartheid in public 
transportation or rail way carts was Constitutional as long as facilities were equal, a ruling 
which any thinking person would know was patently dishonest. ld. 
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of legalized racial discrimination,l04 but they also aided racial oppression, 
subordination, and violence against socially marginalized Blacks, Asians, 
Hispanics, Native Americans, Jews, and so-called White ethnics from 
southern, central, and eastern European countries. lOS All this happened 
under the watchful eyes of the historically prevailing conventional or 
idealist legal professionalism that we insist is in need of overhaul and 
recalibration for our time and era. 
Furthermore, there is the contemporary American experience of 
legalized torture, privacy invasions, and negations of civil rights and 
liberties that exists under the advice and guidance of prominent and 
respected professional lawyers, judges, lawyer-politicians, and legal 
policy advisers. However, out of every crisis in the history of a people 
comes a deepening of insight into the true nature of human beings and the 
human society. The same also holds true for law, legality, lawyers, the 
legal profession, the legal system, and conventional idealist 
professionalism. As the former totalitarian Soviet communist empire 
emerged after World War II, there also emerged a corresponding 
American historical example of legalized political repression, anti-
communist witch-hunts, invasions of privacy, and violations of civil 
rights during the hearings conducted by Senator Joseph McCarthy. That 
was part of the unqualified rule of law in a civilized society under the 
watchful eyes of its appointed guardians, custodians, and caretakers. 
Nearly one half century later, when Americans were confronted with the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a substantial part of the true rather 
than fair-weather nature of our society, culture, interpreted Constitution, 
enacted laws, and the justice system emerged again. Almost overnight, 
the idealist values and platitudes of our conventional rule of law and 
diplomacy quickly receded when the power-discursive politics of safety 
and security became front-page material. It soon became obvious that 
many legal professionals in senior justice and administrative positions 
would readily approve unprovoked or preemptive State aggression, war, 
invasions of privacy, deprivations of civil liberties, violations of human 
rights, and torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment against real 
or imagined enemies.106 
104 See, e.g., Verne Ilia R. Randall, Race, Racism and the Law; Examples of Jim Crow 
Laws, http://academic.udayton.eduirace/02rights/jcrow02.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
105 See generally JOE R. FEAGIN, SYSTEMIC RACISM: A THEORY OF OPPRESSION (Routledge 
2006) and MARTIN N. MARGER, RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Wadsworth Publishing Co., 8th ed. 2008). 
106 The two definitive references on the subject are PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: 
RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES (Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 
and JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (W.W. Norton & Co., 2007). For some of the standard operating 
procedures, see the incisive work by so-called American terrorism czar, RICHARD A. CLARKE, 
AGAINST ALL ENEMIES (Free Press 2004). 
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In addition to the detainee and prisoner abuses and scandals at both 
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, which were militarily unnecessary, 
horrendous activities including extra-judicial killings, extra-ordinary 
rendition, torture, simulated drowning or "water-boarding," "enhanced 
interrogation," preventive detention without charge or trial, and tainted 
military tribunals became the practiced nature of law, legality, and justice 
in America. 107 Collaborating with very senior lawyers in the Justice 
Department, then White House Chief Legal Counsel, and later U.S. 
Attorney General for the Bush administration, Alberto Gonzales, advised 
that the Geneva Conventions were quaint and obsolete and so-called 
"enemy combatants" were not entitled to prisoner-of-war status under the 
Geneva Conventions, which would necessarily grant them certain 
protections. 108 With the concurrence of U.S. Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales, the Dick Cheney-Karl Rove masterminds of the Bush 
administration's tyrannical tendencies even went so far as to fire nine 
U.S. Attorneys whose fidelity to the new legal-policy dispensation was in 
doubt. 109 Cheney and Rover would go on to insist that the firings were 
professional rather than political,llo despite critics assertions that it was 
all political. 
Regardless, the point to emphasize is that these were not mere 
happenstance but institutionalized professional conduct within the legal 
and justice system whereby many well-respected lawyers, judges, 
congressional lawyer-politicians, legal policy advisers, law professors, 
and legal think-tanks legitimized and cheered-on many of the Draconian 
policies of the Bush administration. I I I Because those impugned policies 
and convictions run deep in the culture, economy, and polity of our 
civilized society of unquestioned and unqualified rule of law, the Obama 
administration has simply reformulated but not abandoned or eradicated 
many such legal abuses and misuses. Indeed, even in 2009 when 
segments of the American public confronted the Obama administration 
with vocal calls to formally investigate and censor the legalized excesses 
107 See SANDS, supra note 106. 
108 ld. 
109 ld. Philippe Sands, himself Queen's Counsel and Professor of International Law at 
The University College, London, has been particularly outraged that the fmgerprints of the 
most senior lawyers in the Bush administration--our storied guardians of the rule of law-
were all over the design and implementation of the abusive interrogation policies and 
practices. His dishonor roll call using the last names of the torture team of lawyers that made 
the Bush administration believe it could circumvent international law, the Geneva 
Conventions, and the U.S. Army's own Field Manual are: Addington, Bybee, Gonzales, 
Haynes, and Yoo. ld. 
110 ld. 
III ld. 
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of the Bush administration,112 the Obama administration chose not to 
investigate, prosecute, or censor. 113 As usual, the ideological justification 
was a variation on letting sleeping dogs lie, public safety and national 
security interests,114 which are the same interests that many courts have 
also continued to invoke while overseeing procedurally questionable 
trials. Even as a matter of degree rather than kind, it is thus a mistake to 
think that it was only under Nazi Germany that criminal and 
administrative prosecutions and proceedings were procedurally tainted or 
otherwise compromised for whatever rationalizations. 
iv. Not One Size Fits All Please 
Moreover, the formulated ideals of professionalism omit or gloss over 
the differing experiential and world-view realities of internal stratification 
within the legal profession and amongst lawyers themselvesYs Some 
lawyers who are highly ranked by their peers inhabit questionable morals 
and conduct themselves unconscionably, often at the expense of, or while 
exploiting, the poor and powerless under the guise of vague contractual 
rights and obligations. Conversely, other lawyers, who are highly 
principled, serve in modest-paying jobs, yet they attempt to solidify the 
American legal system's eloquent promise of equality and fairness in the 
everyday lives of the poor and powerless. 
Some prosecutors, who as a rule serve without heed to political 
ambitions, spend their entire legal careers trying to deprive some 
members of the public of their civil liberties under the guise of pressing 
the public interest in safety or security. Often defense attorneys with 
little or no political capital go to great lengths to keep all citizens, 
including criminally charged outlaws, out of prison in hopes of achieving 
justice and fairness for the same public. 
Other than a shared interest in the professional practice of law, which 
is certainly important, as a practical matter, do all these lawyers in 
various practice areas necessarily share the same ideals of 
professionalism, no matter what? With respect, we doubt it. That is at 
least debatable, especially as the ideals of professionalism necessarily 
draw on a value system that presupposes interests, principles, and choices 
112 See, e.g., text and attached files in Center for Constitutional Rights, The Spanish 
Investigation into US. Torture, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/spanish-
investigation-us-torture (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 See, e.g., ANSELEM L. STRAUSS, PROFESSIONS, WORK AND CAREERS 10 (Transaction 
Books 1975) (stating that the professions are not homogenous communities but loose 
amalgamations of segments pursuing different objectives in different manners). Lawyers and 
law practice are segmented both vertically or hierarchically between practice areas (e.g., 
corporate versus public interest/legal aid practice), and horizontally within particular niches of 
the same practice areas (e.g., criminal prosecution versus criminal defense). Id. 
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in terms of high-order issues and dilemmas of socio-Iegal and moral-
ethical philosophy. 116 
These substantive dilemmas and internal contradictions do not 
suddenly disappear simply because we formulated an elegant list of 
ideals, principles, and standards of professionalism. Without imputing 
any untoward intentions, one could argue that the Ideals may in fact have 
unwittingly privileged the interests of some legal practice groups, niches, 
and proclivities (e.g., large firm corporate and insurance defense bar), 
while simultaneously omitting or silencing the interests of others (e.g., 
solo and small firm plaintiff bar) in important respects. Based on similar 
concerns, it could be said that the majestically elegant law prohibits both 
the rich and the poor, upon penalty of imprisonment, to sleep under a 
bridge, to beg for alms, or to steal bread to feed their hungry children. 
Regardless, we will again note that the legal practice transactional 
conflicts inherent to such a scenario of structural and philosophical 
dilemmas and contradictions may arise in forms the Ideals could 
mistakenly try to exhaust unsuccessfully with the language of courtesy, 
civility, or decorum. With respect, while courtesy, civility, and decorum 
are important professional qualities to be cultivated, they are not the only 
considerations in our discourse of professionalism. 
v. For Better And Not So Good 
The remainder of the Ideals, which deal with itemized ideals of 
professionalism, including: accountability and trustworthiness; a calling 
to service; education, mentoring, and excellence; and fairness, civility, 
and courtesy, do a reasonable and commendable job of covering the 
standard expectations. ll7 The Ideals address fidelity, credibility, and 
integrity to clients; the rules and the courts; punctuality, preparation, 
competency, and decorum when dealing with the court, opposing counsel, 
parties, and the public; honest and candid communication of non-
confidential matter; and the need to resist financial pressures that may 
cloud one's professional judgment. The Ideals also exhort lawyers to go 
about their jobs with the goal of equality and fairness by avoiding 
wrongful discrimination based on "race, sex, gender, religion, national 
origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, 
socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.,,118 The document expects 
all lawyers to ensure that they are current in legal knowledge and with 
changes in the law that may affect their clients' interests. 119 The 
116 For example, when two equally valuable moral-ethical-legal principles collide, why 
and how should one yield? Who gets to make that decision? What criteria is used? Whose 
best interests should be served? 
117 Ideals of Professionalism, supra note 6. 
118 Id. at 2. 
119 Id. at 4. 
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document calls upon senior lawyers to mentor new lawyers willingly, 
both by their own examples and by ensuring that the new lawyers learn 
and apply the ideals of professionalism in their professional lives. 120 The 
Ideals not only invite lawyers to recognize that the practice of law is a 
calling to public service rather than only a business pursuit, but also 
presents an expectation that lawyers accept responsibility for ensuring 
that justice is available to all people regardless of financial means. 121 
Perhaps as a reflection of the balance of current concerns, the Ideals 
include copious language on the question of civility in all 
communications, including electronic communications, which is certainly 
current and in keeping with the times. 
Overall, the snapshots that come across from the remainder of the 
Ideals are all legitimate professionalism standards, principles, 
expectations, concerns, and issues. The problem with the Ideals is not its 
adherence to legitimate and long-standing professionalism standards and 
issues. Rather, it is the Ideals' glaring omissions, value priorities, and 
one-dimensional portraits that are of greatest concern. For example, 
those lawyers committed to the progressive and anti-oppressive practice 
of law certainly value and recognize fairness, civility, and courtesy. It is 
simply not enough to exhibit courtesy or display insincere politeness if 
the lawyer is presenting unreasonable claims, making unreasonable 
requests, or otherwise taking unconscionable procedural positions 
because of the extraordinary financial resources that allow him or her to 
pursue a protracted litigation. 
Frankly, as this discussion has practical, not simply theoretical, 
implications, many lawyers are amazed that Maryland's professionalism 
rules indulge rather appalling and abusive uses of the legal system. For 
example, a lawyer defending a wealthy corporate client has a financial 
incentive to draw out litigation by excessively filing baseless preliminary 
motions. Such an attorney should resist the financial temptations and 
adhere to the professionalism rules promulgated under the Ideals. In the 
end, the Maryland legal community would benefit from a warts and all 
discourse of professionalism consistent with the finer, albeit meSSler, 
points of the reality of practicing law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, rather than proceeding as ifthere is a unitary conception of 
law and legality, a homogenizing professional law practice experience, or 
a disinterested set of core values animating professionalism itself, a more 
complete discourse of legal professionalism should track the various 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 4-5. 
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approaches to, and contradictions within, law and professional law 
practice groups. For the same reasons that our theory of human rights 
would have been impoverished if the United Nations had stopped at its 
storied first generation of rights, our understanding and action about legal 
professionalism would be malnourished if we failed to forage beyond the 
seminal ideals. 
All lawyers want a profession that is glorious and effective, but there 
is a need for a compelling internal debate about the legal profession 
because we do not all necessarily always see or experience law the same 
way. Maybe recalibrating the discourse of legal professionalism in ways 
that openly and directly address the realities of the segmented working 
world of lawyers and legal practice would ultimately serve the profession 
and all practitioners better than a straightjacket, unitary, and essentialist 
approach to twenty-first century legal professionalism. 122 To be both 
realistic and comprehensive, lawyers could use having the standard or 
conventional portrait of the Ideals of Professionalism for everyone 
alongside annotated nuances, targeted provisions, and meaningful 
formulations for the differential tracking of law practice and lawyers or 
122 The twenty-first century is mentioned here because other than perhaps impending 
demographic and generational shifts within the legal profession, there are factors largely 
external to law, legality, legal practice, and the legal profession that are affecting all of that in 
ways that might cause some anxieties or concerns about the professional standing, image, or 
stability of lawyers and legal practice. We live in a post-industrial and postmodern 
information society, economy, and culture. In addition to the disciplinary and occupational 
practice boundary threats coming from immense trends toward transnational, interdisciplinary, 
and multidisciplinary occupational and professional practice arrangements, the 
contemporaneous changes in information and communication technology are not only 
redefining law itself but also changing law practice and the operations of the profession. 
Technology appears to be in the driver's seat some of the time in the courthouse, our offices, 
and our dealings with the courts and opposing counsel. One cannot in good conscience be 
into web surfing, e-mailing,e-trading,blogging,podcasting, YouTube,Craig's List, or 
Facebook and yet not realize that some of the alternative, snappy, brisk, and casual sub-
cultural trappings of such technologies will rub off on you, legal practice, and the legal 
profession. The truth is that all of those things we fancy using also imperceptibly make some 
of our work seem routine, deskilled, and even commonplace. Little wonder that paralegals, 
legal agents, accountants, bookkeepers, real estate agents, and sundry two-year college 
graduates working as temps or consultants on anything under the sun are finding it easier to 
encroach on what is traditionally a lawyer's job. Some observers who probably wanted to 
make a name by getting ahead of the times have even forecast the end oflawyers! My point, 
then, is that we should probably be rethinking and reframing professionalism or fashioning a 
new professionalism for our age, rather than harping back to the mostly mythical glory days 
that some astute historians would call the way we never were when the whole truth emerges. 
As Alan Cross, music and technology columnist for METRO newspaper has noted on the 
topic of "The iPad Revolution," "[i]f there's one thing we've learned since the Regency TR-
I-the very first transistor radio in 1954-it's not the device itself, but it's what the device 
allows us to do and the behaviors that result. Continue to expect many unintended and 
unforeseen consequences." Alan Cross, Apple iPad is Poised to Change Music, METRO 
CANADA, May 28, 2010, at 31. 
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the dissimilar experience of law and the legal profession by subsets of 
practItioners. This article submits that those are also legitimate but 
omitted or silenced professionalism issues within the ambit of 
accountability, public service, education, mentoring, excellence, fairness, 
fidelity, civility, integrity, and trustworthiness without which mere 
courtesy alone, for example, may seem quite insincere. Valuable and 
thoughtful though the Ideals of Professionalism may be, further discourse 
and more meaningful discussion on the limitations therein would be 
beneficial. 
